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This thesis suggests criteria n=35ssary for the assess-
ment of personnel readiness in the Wast German Army. They
should make the effort to achieve personnel readiness more
efficient and the evaluation process more
objective.
The proposed physical criteria ar? the degree of devia-
tion from the au-horized strength, the degree to which the
military occupational specialities are achieved and the
availability of leaders aid rank and file for essential
training. Proposed psychological criteria include handling
of disciplinary power by the company commander and -^rhs sub-
jects of complaints, enlistment and raenlistment s . Consid-
eration was also given to the subjects of personnel
turnover, civic education and leadership and social factors.
Where required, the historic and legal motivation for
the criteria is elaborated and suggestions are made for det-
ermining the actual content and weigit of the criteria
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I. INTRODOCriDJi
Wher. West Germa.ny joined the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nisation (NATO) in 1955 it was obliged lo provide Arm-ed
Forces in a total strength of 5 00,000 men. Of those the
Army in the Field had to comprise twelve cons-anzly ready
divisions. Because of the narare Df this service and its
requirements (i.e. less t.echnical th=r. Navy and Air Force
and containing a much larger amount Df jobs which reqire
only short training) about fourty percent of the manpower of




In 1973 when ihe Iraft was reduced from eighteen to
fifteen months, a new concept of training had to be intro-
duced. This required a shift of the greatest amount of
trainina onto the regular units in order to maintain a suf-
ficient number of regular units at an acceptable level cf
readiness. With the old training concept the number of
training units would have had to be increased at a cost to
regular uni-s resulting in fewer immediately deployable
units.

The new concept rsiuced tha basic training to three
months. It is organized into a gen=?ral part common ro all
services and a specialized part which provides basic skills
of the military occupational speciality (MOS) of the con-
script. The specialized training which is spread over the
remaining twelve months of service tim= is performed in the
regular units. It is composed of individual and team train-
ing which progresses from squad leval to battalion level
[R3f. 2].
In 1978 after some expsrienca with the new system
improved guidelines were issued to eliminate frictions and
optimize training. Obisctives wer= (1) to harmonize the
instructions for basic and specialized training, (2) -o der-
ive the training objectives for the anit from i'-s mission
and the determining elements of the individual conscript's
occupational task, (3) to organize the training with respect
to these learning objecti/es, (4) to reorganize the training
material wi-^h respect to training programs, subprograms and
training -copies, (5) to determine a nean -ime for the
instructions, (6) to provide all units with new, easier 'o
use training materials and (7) to develop uniform guidelines
for the checks to determine if the training objectives were
reached [Ref. 3: p. 199].

2. General Training Schedule
As the cornerstone of rhe special training material
the Instruction for the Troop Training Number 2 (ITr2) was
issued [Ref. 4]. These irr2s exist in about eighty diffe-
rent outfits according to the different company types in the
Army. The selection and organisation of the training
objectives in the various ITT2s is derived from the employ-
ment principles of the specific branch of the Army and
should enable the respective company to participate success-
fully in the combined arms combat. To lead to this objec-
tive it provides (1) the topics to continue the individual
training of the conscripts such that they are iidependen- ly
able to mas-er their tasks and defend themselves and (2)
provides the employment and operating principles for sguads,
pla-cons and the company translated into training topics
[Hef. 5: p. 11 ].
3- Regular ^nit Training.
The specialized -raining in -he regular units starts
with a -^wo week introductory training for the newly assigned
draftees to make them familiar with the regular company,
their home for the rest of their service time. It is
further intended to be the beginning of the integration of
10

the conscripts into their squad. This period is followed by
individual training and by training on squad, platoon and
company level.
The training schedule comprises a toral of 1980
hours for the four specialized training quarters (220 days
with nine hours per day) . The material is comprised of sev-
enteen percent general training , fourry-five percent spe-
cial training, twenty-thras percent other draining, and
fifteen percent time for disposition of the commander.
The training topics are also organized with r^sp^ct
to four categories. (1) The introductory training contains
about eighty hours of training prssented parallel to the
regular schedule. (2) The issigned training, whirh contains
1190 hours comprises most of -he MOS specific training to be
performed only in the specific quartar -o which it is
assigned. (3) Not assigned training consists of 500 hours
with general duties and guard duty, organizing and disposi-
tion time. (4) Additional training Is to be performed on
orders when local conditions are appropriate such as engi-
neer training, air defense shooting, and winter combat





The other important ITT, -^^he Instruc^ioD for the
Troops Training Number 6 {ITT6) whicii provided the reason
for this thesis, was issued in 1931 and has the subtitle Th=
Company Inspection in the Army [Ref. 7]. It rejuires an
inspection of each company at least 5 very fifteen months by
its battalion commander to evaluare the training and
readiness of the unit.
2- Inspect 4.on Reguirsm ents
The inspection consists of three parts.
Part one covers tna inspection to be held in the
barracks. It contains a knowledge t^st, instruction in
civic education and leadership, trailing and drill en
general equipment and weapons, maintsnance, sports ate.
Part two, the inspection of th9 unit's combat task
performance, is the most important part of the company
inspection and the result cannot be compensated for by
performances in the other parts.
Part three is the evaluation of the physical and
professional achievements and results of other inspections,
since the last company inspection 'Ref. 8: pp. 11-1 3].
12

Design and evaluation of ths inspection is the sole
responsibility of the respective battalion commander. He
has to combine in his final evaluatiDn of a company's readi-
ness the result of the company inspection with his findings
of his supervision of the company over the past fifteen
months [Ref. 9: pp. 14-15 ].
The assessment has to be stated in one of the four
categories
:
FOLLY READY: The performance meets the requirements
without exception.
READY: Performance meets the requirements.
MARGINALLY READY: The perfomance shows deficiencies
but in general still meets the requirements,
NOT READY: The performance dDes not meet the
requirements in general or with respsct to important parts
[Ref. 10: p. 15].
C. CRITIQUE
These very general guidelines for the evaluation and
assessment of unit performance and readiness have several
weaknesses. They are with respect to the reliability and
meaningfulness of the personnel reporting system similar to
the critique of the US Army Training and Evaluation Program
13

(ARTEP) by Medlin [Ref. 11], Golub [i^ef. 12], Madison and
others [Ref. 13 ].
The guidelines provide neither cDoiplete standardized
performance variables or behavioral Dbjectives nor effective
or efficient ineas'irem<^nt procedures which reflect rsadin^^^ss
criteria derived from historic data, research or statisti-
cally evaluated expert opinions. Instead they rely on the
subjective unaided opinion of the individual battalion com-
mander, his choice of the readiness criteria and their
evaluation and weighting in the final assessment.
The complexity of mod = rn military units and the fac^
that there exist vast amounts of manuals and regulations
regarding every aspect of military fanctioning, especially
training, compounds the problem of parforming meaningful
assessment of performance. The trailing of an infantry bat-
talion, for example, is regulated by about three-hundred
manuals, fifty of which mast be known in detail to the
commander [Ref. 14: p. 87].
The ITT6 does not contain a part which deals exclusively
with personnel criteria and subsequently does not provide
guidelines for the evaluation of existing data and reports
and procedures to acquire additional data. It further does
14

not provide procsdurss for measuring objectively and effi-
ciently individual and unit performances, i.e., hew to
design and set up this important part of the inspection and
how, when, and on what level to gathsr data. There also
exists little direction zo provide effec-ive feedback for
the uni-^^s training.
Further does the ITT6 neither make proposals for ade-
quate changes in individual and unit ^raining programs, nor
suggest actions -o improvs personnel deficienciss as the
result of an inspection while staying within ths fram^ of
the 1980 annual tiraining hours. This is even more important
as The actual average time a unit is on duty is about 2800
hours per year as a result of field exercises and other
additional requiremenxs [Rsf. 15: p. 255].
Finally ITT6's most important deficiency is tha- it does
not provide reference points or benchmarks for the battalion
commander to guide him in the determination of che readiness
category to which a unit belongs.
Because human judgement represents the decisive factor
in the evaluation process it has to be aided and provided
with efficient measurement prcceduras and explicit criterion
to be able to arrive at results which can be compared to the
15

performance standards, ths performancs at a different time
and/or under other conditions of the same unit =»nd with the
performence of other units.
D. SCOPE OF EFFORT
In this thesis it is intended to propose criteria for
the evaluation of personnel readiness during a company
inspection which could aid the battalion and company comman-
der and lead to a more standardized, objec-^ive and efficient
inspection and assessment of the readiness of a unit. It
may further provide basic information, for a new company com-
mander about the essential responsibilities he has with
respect to personnel.
The approach is to organize the rsadiness factors for a
company into sets of four functions. (1) personnel readi-
ness, (2) training, (3) mission perfDrmance during a field
exercise and (4) material readiness.
Criteria and procedures -^.o evaluate mission performance
and material readiness ar= availabel on NATO Isvel in pro-
grams such as the Tactical Evaluatioi (TACEVAL) for -^he Air
Force, the Flag Officer Ssa Training (FOST) for the Navy and
tha recently developed Operational R=adiness Training
16

Program (ORTP) for land forces [Ref. 16]. Becaase of
national differances and other problems, personnel readin=3ss
is only evaluated in these inspections with respect to
personnel present for deployment.
For personnel readine=s criteria have to be found which
are comprehensive and simple enough to be handled with
reasonable effort and with paper and pencil.
A further step has to be the dsfinition of guidelines to
aid the commander in the determination of performance stan-
dards for the time of the inspection during a specific
guarter.





In order to evaluate personnel readiness, criteria which
are applicable to all companies must be developed. Its two
elements, physical and psychological factors, are of
fundamental importance.
Although one can argue that trailing is a logical third
factor of personnel readiness, in th? current effort -rain-
ing is separated from the other two factors and should be
evaluated as a separate funcrion.
A. PHYSICAL FACTORS
1 , General Remarks
The physical readiness manifasted in numbers of sol-
diers, plays an important role in political discussions
within NATO. The number oz ready troops provided for the
joined defense are critically watchei because of their
importance for a credible deterrance against ^he Warsaw
Pact. The nature of the threat, 400,030 Soviet troops
alone, organized in twenty- five divisions of the highest
readiness category are stationed within an area of 150
kilometers depth east of the boarder of NATO's central
18

region arid the NATO doctriie of Forward Defense which means
to engage the autacker at the border with own ground troops.
Tha doctrine was developed as a result of the fact that
within 150 kilometers west of the border live approximately
twenty million people and twenty-fivs percent of the German
industrial capacity [ Ref . 17: p. 12U ].
This high readiness is even aore important since the
majori-cy of the NATO forc5s in the central region have to
move on the average more than 200 kilometers to reach their
deployment positions determined in th9 general defense plan
(GDP) [Pef. 18: p. 18]. In order to utilize the assumed
six-y hour warning period before an a^-rack [Ref. 19: p. 2U ]
to bring t.he units to full war strength by reservists and to
reach the GNP positions, the units have to be k~pt at an
high level of readiness with respect to present personnel
and training status.
In order to keep the regular units in an acceptable
training status, compensate instantl/ for personnel losses
and thus guarantee permanent, readiness, one fifth of the
personnel of an Army unit has to be replaced at the begin-
ning of each quarter. This has the effect that about twenty
percent of a unit's personnel is in its first, second, third
19

or fourth training quarter. The othrr twenty percent are
enlisted personnel. As the draftee is not considered to be
completely trained before passing through all four quarters,
a company's readiness can therefore never reach the maximum
level.
But the total number of enlisted men or field units
alone is not sufficient to derive a deterrance value. In
order to get meaningfull readiness figures, the number of
personnel present on company level his to be evaluated.
2. QS^ating Strength
a. Reporting System
The actual procedure in the German Army for
reporting personnel figures concerning authorized strength,
actual strength and presence for training with respect to
officers, NCOs and rank and file is the repor- to the
battalion staff every morning.
b. Table of Organization =n3 Ss-ablishment (TOE)
Strength
(1) ^ar TOE. The basis for the number ^nd
grades of personnel available in a company is the TOE which
is derived from the war mission of tie uni- and au-horized
by parliament. There are two different TOEs in the Army, a
20

war TOE and a peace TOE, Th« TOE for the war situation is
intended to be brought to full strength with reservists and
equipment after NATO has dsclared a ganeral alert and which
comprises then about one million men, which includes the
peace strength.
(2) Peace TOE. The peac9 TOE is bound to the
340,000 men limit and therefore results in various degrees
of cadreing depending on -^he required availability of forces
for deterrance. Besides *:he cadreing, the propor-cion of
draftees compared to enlisted is of importance. In a regu-
lar Army unit such as a communicatioa company, it is about
eighty to twenty percent.
For the Army in the Fisll, assigned to NATO, -^he
brigades as the smallest formation capable to conduct the
combined arms combat have the highest: personnel readiness
with an average of eighty seven percant war time TOE person-
nel while the respective numbers for the divisional troops
and the corps troops are fifty-one and fourty-six percent.
In t.he Territorial Army, which remains under
national command after geieral alert and has tha mission to
secure the area behind ths corps, th?r= exist only stored
equipment during peace time with -ha excep+ion of some
21

engineer, military police, and signal uni-^.s and the twelve
home defense brigades which inay reach a TOE strangi-h of up
to seventy percent.
c. Authorized Strength
But because of additional peace tims functions
for the Armed Forces such as training and administration
which are not all covered in the TDE and general budget res-
trictions, personnel have to be deducted from the regular
units* peace TOE. This shortage of personnel rrsulns not
only in the cancellation Df billets but also in their deval-
uation. Officer billets are degrade! to NCO billets and
draftees fill the billets of NCOs.
d. Reduction Causes
C) Training, Proaramras. A further reduction of
a unit's available personnel is caused by an ever increasing
demand for military and civilian training courses and the
very limited personnel reserve of only 12 000 billets [ Ref
.
20: p. 13]. These billets are primarily occupied by those
officers and NCOs who attend long training programs like the
four year officer cadet training at Armed Forces Universi-
ties or civilian education during the last eighteen months
of their tour for those NCOs who enlisted for twelve or
22

fifteen years. All persoanel who at-^end training courses of
less than two years duration have to remain on their TOE
position in their unit and thus are not only not available
for training and deployment but also block a billet for
another soldier who cannot be enlisted or promoted.
All these conditions reduce the actual strength
present in a company to an average of eighty percent of the
peace TOE [P-sf- 21: p. 16]. This nuaber often is even
smaller with respect to the leadership of a unit who ar-^ the
primary participants in the longer educa-'-ion programs.
Some of these deficiencies have beeti compensated
for by +.he deployment of civilian workers in certain areas
such as administration and maintenance and a general 5.4
percent surplus of draftees [Ref. 22: p. 220]. But this sur-
plus does not make up for the insufficient qualif ica"^ ion of
the draftees with respect, to the higher valued billet -hey
eventually occupy.
(2) Qualification. The laalif ication of the
draftees for their MOS with respect to physical and psycho-
logical criteria and skills also creates problems. In
1978/79 the demand for iraftees for the Signal Corps with
the required traits could only be eighty-six percent
23

satisfied [Ref. 23 : p. 115]. This :iamber of optimally qua-
lified personnel for training and amployment can further be
reduced where these draftses are n = = d£d in s-ansitive areas
such as communication centers, where a clearance is required
before -^hey can be trained on crypto equipment Dr handle
classified messages. The security check is performed by th=
military counter intelligence and requires about two months.
Because of -he costs it cannot be initiated before the draf-
tees have been assigned tD their futire occupation. The
number of those who are screened out can be significant.
Reasons, besides personal debts, are primarily frequent
visits to East Germany or close relatives who live there.
(•3) Transfers. Other reasons for shortfalls in
draftees strength are personnel transfers whithDut replace-
ment. Such transfers are mainly motivated by personal cir-
cumstances. The over whelning number of applications for
transfers is motivated by the desire -o get closer to heme
or get back into the education process. For example a draf-
tee's service time can be reduced whrn he proves that he has
signed up for a civilian training program which can only be
joined once a year. If this date falls within the last




(^) status Chiria[es. Redactions in the strength
of rank and file of a unit are also caused by those con-
scripts who sign in and enter into the officer or NCO cadet
training. Additional reasons are changes from enlistment to
draft or applications to be exempted from serviag in the
military.
Because many of these causes for reducing the
respective operating strength of a unit are out of the reach
and responsibility of a company commander they cannot be
blamed on the unit in the readiness evaluation. However,
for example, the shortage of personnel, especially in the
leadership presence, will influence io*ivaticn, effective-
ness of training and maintenance and can limit a unir's
ability to perform assigned missions successfully.
3. MOS^illed Positions
a. Reporting Procedure
(1) German Arm^ . The presently valid personnel
reporting system in the German Army concerning ':he y[05 posi-
tions requires a report of each unit as of the fifth of the
first month of a new quarter. The most important criteria
for the personnel which occupies these positions are rank,
required and acquired MOSs, status and a statement about th=^
25

ac±ual occupation of the inhabitant Df each position. D'=vi-
ating occupations can be platoon leader, an administrative
job in the battalion staff, detatchoirnt s to a basic training
coipany or service school for a training course.
(2) US Army. The QS Army ??0S readiness condi-
tion (REDCON) rating system consists of four categories C-1
to C-U,Each category represents an iitsrval between the mar-
gins of eighty-six percent of full TDE strength for category
C-1 and sixty-eight percent for category C-4.Thi3 percen-
tages of the TOE strength is personnel, who are qualified to
perform the duties of the position to which they are
assigned.
The deficiencies of present valid system are the
possibilities to match up enlisted parsonnel two pay grades
higher than their rank and to consider an individual in on-
the-job training (OJT) capable of performing well on the ilOS
position [Ref. 24 p. 17].
b. Enlisted
Because the personnel aanagement for officers
and NCOS is centralized, lissmatches of rank or MOS are not
accepted. A corporal may have to wait for a billet to
become vacant if he does not want to be transfered after
25

acguiring all requirements for serg^in*:. But it is, on the
other hand, possible to ksep sergeants whith adequate rank
in a position for which thsy do not have the adequate MOS
whan their retraining is authorized. This of^-ea happens in
the case of TOE changes to keep good personnel and reduce
the number of transfers.
Despite centralized personnel management within
the services, there still remain tha important functions of
personnel selection, scheduling of training and reenlistment
for the individual company commandar.
c. Draftees
For draftees and short tarm enlisted the situa-
tion with respect to the ?!DS is quite different. Here the
companies are primarily rasponsibla for personnel
managemen"^
.
All draftees acquire the necessary first WOS for
their occupation in the regular unit at the end of -^ha three
months basic training program. They may also acquire the
military drivers license as a second MOS. Although their
skills and knowledge are vary limited after this shor~
training there is no further MOS tast scheduled during the




Besides this and the lack of OJT in units which
ara not performing a peaca tinie mission close to th= war
mission, zhe US Army REDCON rating systs^m cannot be direc-^ly
applied to the German Army.
d. Parallel Training
However there are aOSs for secondarj or very
specialized functions which have to be acquired in the regu-
lar unixs. These are in cryprology, administration and
maintenance. But the majority of MOS awarding is for those
draftees who have to be reassigned a MOS because of short-
falls in personnel critical to a uait's readiness. It is
also often practiced for example in units wi*h a large num-
ber of the same MOSs such as teletype operator, to pick
replacements for the few administrative jobs which have
similar prerequisites froi those teletype operators.
There are also several additional func-cions in a
company which have to be taken care of by the existing per-
sonnel wihout being defined in -he TD5 or having an MOS.
But these additional functions are essential in order to
conduct an effective training progran and will secure the
survivability of a unit under combat condi-ions. Examples
are the squad per platoon for operating and maintaining the
23

Inuclear, biological and chemical (NB2) defense equipment,
squads for fire fighting and salvage and rescue operations,
first aid personnel or instructors for marksmanship, tank
and aircraft defense [Ref. 25: p. 30].
** • Availabliity for Tr ainina
The decision of the Army to transfer -^he specialized
training for the draftees into the regular units and spread
it over the entire twelve months of their service time in
order to reach a maximum number of available units,
increased the problem of soldiers not being available for
trainina because they were occupied with other duties.
As the overall requirements for regular uni^.s were
not reduced bur on the contrary a variety of peace time
demands wer^^ added, this permanent piroblem of too few soldi-
ers attending regular training was built into the system.
It is often a favourite inspection topic during unannounced
inspections by higher commanders.
a. Additional MOS
The variety of additional functions demanded by
manuals and orders which ire in addition to the twenty-five
percent secondary functions of all IDS posts [Ref. 26].
Examples for occupations which require additions.! training
29

tiine are NBC defense, first aid, salvage and rescue, fire
fighting, operating special equipment and administrative
functions in a communicatiDn center. Most of this training
has to be conducted parallel to the regular training
required for the primary aos function.
b. Administration
The administrative jobs, at least those within a
battalion, are rarely adequately raan:ied to enable the per-
formance of regular work., not to mention those times when
the occupant is attending a training course or Dn leave.
These shortages require additional attachments of personnel
from other MOSs to ensure continuous operation.
c. Inspections
The great number of inspections (about thirty
per year) for a regular army unit [Rsf. 27: p. 129] requires
careful preparation. But the preparation *:ime provided by
the annual training schedule is not nearly sufficient. This
problem is intensified by the fact that especially ^he exte-
rior inspections from division or corps level have shifted
from functional checks to more general checks. They include
for example the finish of vehicles [Ref. 28] which increases




A further area of functi^as which detract per-
sonnel from training are guard duty, transfer of material,
administrative matters, detachments to officer and NCO
messes or attendance at sports or other compe-^ition teams
during preparations or a competition which represent the
unit or the battalion.
e. Medical Problems
This category comprises reasons which limit the
deployability of soldiers. The exemptions which have a
major impact on readiness and occur nost frequeatly are
those which are concerning outdoor training, sports, march-
ing, carrying a helmet or weapon etc. Absence from training
and exercises is also caused by those soldiers who go to see
a doctor or are transferred to central hospitals or civilian
specialists for treatment.
f. Additional Leave
A final categDry is that created by soldiers on
additional leave for extra duties or outstanding perfor-
mance. This problem is created by the significantly higher
weekly service time of fifty-six hours for nearly eighty
percent of all Army units ' Ref. 29: p. 21] and the fact that
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the pay for soldiers is ths same as for all other civil
servants who work forty hours a weak.
Because the financial resources are very scarce,
only about thirtyfive dollars per moith are presently paid
for enlisted and about twenty for draftees. A common way to
make up for this extra time is to allow extra Isave. But
these extra days off can only be taken during regular train-
ing, because there are many events wtiich require maximum
personnel presence such as field exercises, insoections, the
general holiday period where a fifty percent presence is
mandatory and for phases of training considered vital.
The problem has recen"^-ly been intensified by an
order of the Inspector General of the Army to reduce the
average weekly duty zime by four hours in order to save com-
pensatory pay. This constitutes a great challenge for all
commanders because neither the mission requirements no-
training requirements were reduced.
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
1 • Gener al g.emar.ks
The evaluation of psychological factors de-ermining
personnel readiness is the most difficult and controversial
part of -che evaluation of a military unit. Because the
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difficulties in assessing them objectively under the cordi-
tions of an inspection ara so complex, even for trained per-
sonnel, they are often omtnitted or only very superficially
adressed.
a. Historic Background
The public discussion in Germany about the mili-
tary over the last twenty years was dominated by topics and
problems of primarily psychological origin. The role of the
Aried Forces and their integration into the democratic
society has been the recipient of much discussion and criti-
gue . Phrases like 'citizen in uniform' and 'civic education
and leadership' and the traits they represent ware widely
discussed but never found entrance iito any performance
evaluation for personnel.
The intensity and controversy of those discus-
sions was caused and based on the role the military played
in German History in this century. It basicly caused the
involvement into two world wars which ended with disasterous
defeats, the death of over five million soldiers and civili-
ans, eleven million refugees and the reduc-^. ion of the free
part of the nation to nearly one third of its 191U exten-
sion. The military was farther despised for its involvement
in the atrocities organized and comitted by the Nazis,
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All these resentments hai to be overcome with
the reinstallation of Armei Forces in 1956. In addition the
wide spread unwillingness to serve as draftees, the separa-
tion from friends and families, disruption of the education
and a drastic reduction in income were arguments against th^-
services.
b. Theoretical Model
These historic and actual realities stood in
sharp contrast to the modal designed to establish effective
Aried Forces which were capable of defending the country
based on a democratic constitution. This concept required,
in order to function properly, draftees which were convinced
citizens and accepted the draft as a necessary contribution
to their country.
In reality draftees were at best indifferen*
towards their duties and were widely ignorant of the basic
rules of their society and their freedom because of the fai-
lure of the public school system to teach these principles
and nourish an appreciation for their society and its
supporting ideals.
By realizing this fact th= Armed Forces received
an additional mission of providing basic information about
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the principles and laws of *ihB Gersiin Constitution and pro-
viding draf-cees with the general defsnse motivation which
means to be willing to fight for thsir country. The Armed
Forces were hardly prepared for this additional responsibil-
ity. Reasons for the limited success in handling this problem
were the scarce time reserved for tha instructions, an envi-
ronment which must be considered inappropriate for learning
about rights and freedom and the g9n?rally inconple^.e
education of officers and MCOs for this demanding task.
Nevertheless progress ha3 to be mad= in this
essential area of motivation. Without it, all efforts in
training and drill to handle the militaty hardware, to
create confidence in this squipment and in the validity of
the military doctrine and leadership would not make much
sense. There would not be the willingness on the part of
draftees to apply them in a conflict without proper
psychological preparation.
c. Special Considerations
Psychological factors ars widely considered to
be the decisive elements when analysing or comparing forces
with respect to their combat value. It is always emphasized
that the willingness zo fight is at least as important as
the capability to fight.
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Napoleon was convinced th=t the weight of morals
compared to the strength of forces are three to one [Ref.
30]. Analysts, for example, assess th= morale of NATO
forces higher than that of the Red Army which seems to be
downgraded by the class system, ethical differences, cut off
of relations with the civilian population etc. ^Ref. 31].
However, there are on the other hand no studies available
which analyse the effects of drug abuse, the peace movement
or the nuclear freeze discussion on the mo-^ivation and
morale of NATO soldiers.
To motivate soldiers is a complex and demanding
process especially when they are draftees. It can be stated
that to motivate services in the military in democratic
societies based en the rights and freedoms of the individual
is much harder to accomplish than it is in an authoritarian
system which bases motivation by hatred against, an enemy.
Motivation is even more important during war
when stress of inexperience, intensity of action and the
death of close friends reguire individual adjustment.
Further, it seems plausible that there is a
significant difference between the situation during an
announced inspection in peace -^ ime where problems are seen
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as challeng'ss which are o/ar after a known amount of time
aLd the uncertainties of a war situation [Ref. 32: p. U57].
A final aspsc*: in assessing psychological fac-
tors is thaz. zhe overall readiness can be far lower than th=
individual parameters indicate because of the effect of -^.he
mix. This means that the individual components do not simply
add up [Ref 33: p. 10] or in other wDrds the total is
smaller than the sum of -che parts.
2» Disciplinary. Power
a. Range
The official function of a company commander is
the lowest level to which disciplinary power is assigned by
Armed Forces Law. It is the one arei with the greatest
influence and gives * he inhabitant his unique, independent
and 'royal' position. This position requires in return a
great sense of responsibility to apply this power and to
achieve the military and educational goals determined by law
and by the manuals.
Primary objectives are education to faithful
service, gallantry, obedience, discipline and fellowship.
Some of these, as the principle of order and obedience, are
characteristic of the military and have to be maintained
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faithfully in order to ensar^ the effective functioning of
the military system.
b. Disciplinary Means
C) Eo£M1 Recognitions. For outstanding pefor-
mance or examples of dedicated service the company commander
is provided with disciplinary means which autorize him to
award a certificate and extra leave ap to five days. The
formal recognition has also to be announced in an order to
the uni-^.
Generally it can be statsd that positive rein-
forcement will improve motivation. »hen the handling of the
disciplinary power is conceived as ths result of sensitive
supervision by the company commander, it will improve morale
and increase readiness [ Ref . 34: p. '-157]. At the moment the
proportion is significantly unbalancsd to the disadventage
of aknowledgements. In 1978 there were 64 038 offences
reported compared to 22 695 aknowledgements [Her. 35: p.
199 ].
(2) Disciplinary Measures. The disciplinary law
provides five ca-^egories of disciplinary measures to achieve
the goals of enforcing ordars, ensurs discipline and to
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educate men. They range from rebakas Dver curfews, fines (up
to one month pay) to confinement up "-.o seven days. When his
powers are insufficient or when it is required by law, the
company commander has to report those cases -^o his battalion
*
commander or to military or civilian prosecuters.
3 . Complaints
a. Importance
Another aspect of the disciplinary power is the
function the company commander has with respect to comp-
laints. This subject is of tremendous importance for the
defense motivation of the soldiers. Because of the reduced
personal rights and the subordinatiDi under the principle of
order and obedience, the procedure of experiencing legality
and just, unbiased treatment becomes vital. Part of the jus-
tice and fairness of the system soldiers are conitted to
defend is the opportuni'ry and procedure by which they can
restore violated rights or receive their entitlements.
The company commander is obliged by law to
decide about written complaints of his subordinates within
certain -^ime limits and state his findings, what parts of it
he accepts and what his measures were to reestablish the




C) Service C2l£laints. The firs- category com-
prises all those complaints which ha^e as subject events and
facts of the daily service. The main topics ara the behavior
of leaders, given orders, educational measures and guard and
presence duties. Presence duties comprise personnel for
essential functions who are available during -he off-duty
time to ensure security and immediats reaction in case of an
alarm
.
(2) Disci plinar y Complaiits. If a soldier coa-
plains about a disciplinary measure Df his compmy comman-
der, the ba-talion commander has to decide on the merits of
the complaint. In the case of a complaint against confine-
ment, it has to be decided by a military judge who in the
first place had to give his permission to execute the
con finement.
(3) Administrative Complaints, A third category
of complaints are those rfhich are directed against measures
of the Armed Forces Administration sjch as disputes about
pay or benefits. They have to be reported by the company
commander to the Armed Forces Administration foe decision.
43

4 . Eva luat ion
a. Objectives
The evaluation of his subordinate officers and
NCDs is one of the most important responsibilities of a com-
pany commander and also part of his position as disciplinary
leader. The objectives in applying this responsibility of
evaluation are tc provide means to select and advance quali-
fied personnel and to help them in ths process Df self-edu-
cation. Because of the great importance for th= career of
the respective soldiers and on their morale and readiness,
the evaluations have to be drafted very carefully to
maintain a climate of cooperation in the unit.
An evaluation has to be ielivered every two
years and consisting of ab^ut twenty individual criteria are
summed up in a letter grade which categorizes the general
ability and further advancement chances of the evaluated
individual, and a number grade to appraise the performance
of the present occupant of the billet.
b. Areas of Impact
C^) £E23.2ti2Ii« -^- primaty use of evaluation is
to determine eligibility f^r promotion . The personnel offices
of the services calculate out of the available data
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qua lif ica*. ion lists, which are service wide, -o danermine
those NCOS who can be promoted if it is possible in their
present billet.
(2) Career iJobs. Evaluations have a very impor-
tant inp'it into the process of selec'^ing NCOs for a career
job. NCOS can apply to enlist for a career, which Jieans to
stay until retirement at age fifty-three, after they have
finished the sergeant course and rec=ived an evaluation en a
sergeant billet. If they are not accepted for career they
have to retire after a maximal enlistment time of fifteen
years
.
The letter grade of the last evaluation and the
number grade of the last three evaluations, with different
weights assigned, can make up to seventy percent of the
points required to qualify for a career job as NCO. The
remaining points are determined by the results of the serg-
eant course and marginal credit is also given for age, rare
qualifications, fitness and the results of military
competitions.
(3) Master Serjeant. A similar system exists to
determine those who are eligible for master sergeant and




Because of the far reaching consequences of an
evaluation on the individual's career it is very important
for their motivation and job satisfaction that they feel
sufficiently informed and counseled by their conpany comman-
der on their career and promotion chances [Ref. 36: p. 456].
C) Information . The data which ars available
for the briefings on evaluations are the average figures of
each branch of the Army from the last evaluation with
respect to frequency of latter and number grade for each
rank. Information on career chances is also available from
the required point score for the preceding year's selec-
tion. With these information every SCO can evaluate his
actual chances.
(2) Interview. Tha most important part of the
evaluation process is the permanent contact between company
commander and the individual to be evaluated. Only by regu-
lar evaluation interviews can one be assured that the
requirements for good performance are known and accepted and
the necessary feedback is available. Interviews are
prerequisites for improvement of performance and can lead to
job satisfaction. It should be understood that the orovided
U3

averages can serve only as a general orien-tation , Each
evaluation has to be determined by th= individual conditions
and achievements.
5« Enlistment and Reenlistment
a. Situation
The majority of the enlistments take place out-
side the influence of the regular unit as people enlist
prior to the beginning of the draft or in the basic training
unit. Even though the personnel management is centralized,
there remains a decisive responsibility within the uni-s to
recruit and select the proper personnel and apply in time
for their training and education courses. An important number
of potential volunteers are influenced in their decision to
enlist by experience in their unit.
The emphasis in the regular uni- wi^h respect to
enlistment has to be put into counseling and selection of
those officers and NCOs who are needed to keep all billets
continuously manned and vho are especially gualified and
willing to be transfered after enlistment.
The importance to the inlividual companies in
reenlisting their own NCOs is further emphasized by the fact
that the NCOs often stay for their to*al enlistment -^ime or
career with the same unit.
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Therefore the emphasis la the regular unit wi-^-h
respect to enlistment has to be put into consultation and
selection of those officers and NCOs who are needed to keep
all billets continuously nanned or vrho are especially
qualified and willing to bs transfsrri after enlistment.
fc. Requirements
Because the personnel management is centralized
and therefore less flexible, detail?! and long term planning
for cadets' and enlisteds' careers is necessary. This is
further emphasized by the variety of requiremenr s frr addi-
tional training and education. Every enlisted soldier has
to be assigned to a training an 1 emplDyment category based
on the demand in the unit and primarily his civilian
education and qualifications.
The regular NCO candidate for the communication
operating category is required to have successfully finished
an apprenticeship in a civilian admi?-istrative job. This
requirement is relatively easy to meat because the vast
majority of the draftees in a communication operating
company are out of civilian administrative sectors.
For the communication control category it is
much harder to find draftees with ths required technical
U5

appren-iceship which are willing to anlist.A primary reason
is that the deaand for them in the market place is also very
high and they are well compensated ia the civilian
community.
c. Training Offer
The willingness to enlist or reenlist is quite
different between the branches of the Army, depending on its
attractiveness and the type of qualifications which can be
achieved during an enlistment. Because the majority of the
enlistees are unsatisfied with their present civilian occu-
pation or want to improve their education [Ref. 37: p. 82],
the type and possibility of education during service time is
very important.
C) Apprenticeship. The main attraction for a
four year enlistment is the offer ro provide the applicants
with the chance to complete an apprenticeship during that
time. As shown in several studies, the primary reason for
sixty-?ight percent of the enlistees for four or more years
is the desire for better training or training at all [Ref.
38: p. 81].
While the apprenticeship for an administrative
job can be completed in a three months training course, that
46

for th9 technical jobs re5aires a year long effort of prac-
tical and theoretical courses. This training has to be syn-
chronized with the military NCO training which takes
fifteen months.
Only if personnel selection and planning is done
at the very beginning of an enlistment can candidates finish
the desired education within t.ha four years. Changes of a
curriculum or inadequate planning result in delays and the
necessity to reenlist for additional years which often is an
obstacle for enlistment or exrension.
(2) Other Training.. For the NCOs with eigh- or
more years of enlistment, there exists a variety of training
possibilities. They range from licences for driving
instruc-^ors through crafts training to undergraduate educa-
tion. The attendance in those courses can be daring the
service time in connection with career courses or at the end
of the enlistment time to increase the chances for a civi-
lian career. For such training, an enlistee is eligible as
a result of his commitment to the Araed Forces and training
is considered a part of his service time. All thos":^ courses
which are not formal training courses required by the bil-
let, are organized by the Armed Forces vocational promotion
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service.lt provides aboat twenty modal courses cf ini-ial
and retraining and offers many possibilities for further-e-
ducation in crafts. The interested soldier can also satisfy
school qualifications from secondary school to senior high
school.
All these training courses can be attended af-^er
duty hours. But the successful participation of an enlisted
depends in part on the support of his unit.
6 • Personnel T urno ver
a. Problem
The turnover rate of par-onnel constitutes a
severe problem for the readiness of i unit and cannot be
analysed from unit strength. It was observed during World
War II that the readiness of units remained relatively
unchanged as long as the replacements were small enough to
be integrated by the 'nucleus' of a mit [Ref. 39].
There are three personnel groups to be consid-
ered with respect to the turnover problem. "Elach is subject
to specific conditions and has its own impac-s on the




For officers the average time in a unit is rela-
tively short but often doable the tins of their US Army
equivalents. In 1979 fourty percent of all captains stayed
for three years with the same unit [Raf. 40: p. 132]. This
is also the average time desired fDc a commpany commander to
be assigned to a unit .
c. NCOS
For NCOS, especially the ranks of sergean-*-, the
time with the same unit is significantly higher than that of
officers. In 1979 thirty-two percent of all sergeants
remained in the same unit for four -.d six years and fifteen
percent even longer, whereas only foar percent were less
than a year with their present unit ] Ref . U1: p. 132]. These
numbers look even better ander -he asoect -har an enlisted
needs at least four years service time before he can be pro-
moted to sergeant. In -ha case of oiisrer sergeants the s-a-
tionarity is even greater. In 1979 foarty percent were
assigned to the same unit for longer than seven years. With
this information it is quite obvious the important role NCOs
play wi-h respect to continuity and solidarity. Essentially





'') EsEia^effliHi Q.12±±- ^^- draftees stay for
twelve months with their assigned unit. This seeais optimal
with respect to the total fifteen moaths of their service
time. However the circumstances whizh detract from this
positive picture are the quartsrwise replacement of person-
nel. In order to maintain non combat units at a high pres-
ence and at an acceptable readiness level, this procedure of
exchanging about twenty percent of ttie personnel of each
unit every quarter was established. The negative effects of
this procedure are primarily psychological.
Three areas of impact: cai be distinguished.
A. Group Cohesion. The permanent turbulance
created by this procedure prevent th= establishing of per-
sonal and group relations within squads, platoons and the
unit as a whole. The compositions of the reams wi-hin the
unit is constantly changing.
B. Social Aspects. Another kind of effect is
the building of a social hierarchy among the draftees,
depending on the quarter they joined the unit. Those con-
scripts who are in the last quarter Df their service time
occupy the top position, I hey have the best knowledge of
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procedures and persons in their unit whereas the newly
attached are uncertain about the military life and therefor?
are at the bottom of the social hierarchy. This development
is a threat to the basic requirement of establishing a sense
of comradeship.
C. Training Status. Another effect of the
replacement rhythm is on a unit's training status. That
means it makes quite a difference with respect to p=rfor-
mance to have in one telecommunication team four soldiers
out of four enlistment quarters on a truck or four groups of
ten draftees from different quarters in the platoon which
run a telecommunication canter. In the case of the platoon
is it much easier to maintain a higher performance level,
because a specialization of the HOSs is possible. Those
specialized functions can be mast,erei in a short time. This
specialization is impossible for the team on the truck
because it has to operate in two shifts where both men must
be able to perform all functions.
Another negative effect of the guarterwise
replacement of personnel is a certain amount cf repetition
of instruction for those irafrees in the higher training
quarters. Although it canno- be -o-aly avoided, the degree
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of repe-^-ition is inversely proportional to the availability
of NCOS, because the draftees cannot be split into different
performance classes,
(2) Transfers. Another problem contributing to
the turnover rate and also of major concern in the public
discussion is the distance between the home and the assigned
unit of a soldier. As the locations of the military instal-
lations do not coinside with the population centers, assign-
ments far from home are iae vitable. Furthermore the short
service time and the technology level in the Armed Forces
require careful personnel selection with respect to abili-
ties and qualifications of the draftees in order to save
training time and get the best qualified man in the right
place. Great progress has been made over the past years and
in 1978 about seventy-five percent of all draftees could be
assigned to units within one hundred miles cf their heme
town [Ref. 42: p. 282 ]. But there reaains a problem because
this percentage canno*^. be further improved. Especially for
those garrisons which are located in remote areas, the prob-
lem can be very pressing when the situation is fur-^her com-
plicated by bad traffic connections. One study indicated
[Ref. 43: p. 293], two thirds of all draftees recommend the
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clDse to home assignments as the bast way -^o increase
enlistments.
The reasons for transfer applications of draf-
tees to assignments closer to home can be subdivided into
three categories:
A. Social Contacts. To maintain contacts wirh
their friends, families and girlfrier^ds are the primary
motivation for draftees to drive home at every possible
opportunity [ Hef . 4U: p. 911]. These same reasons were
given in applications of draftees for transfers to other
units. In reality these reasons are not acceptable. The far
from home assignment is a reasonable hardship of -^he draft.
B. Family Support. The second category con-
tains applications justified by required family support. If
an applicant could prove that his presence at home af-er the
duty hours was required because he was the only son to help
his handicapted parents or to maintain the family business,
he had a good chance to be transfered.
C. Marriage. Seperated couples have not been
an important problem becaus e married men used to be exempted
from the draft. Those who marry during the time in the
services usually get transfered close to home.

D. Policy. The general policy has been for the
commanders of all levels to recommend a transfer only if it
would not endanger the readiness of the unit. This criteria
requires the establishment of a policy, at least within a
battalion, to ensure even handling of the applications. The
policy may be different between the branches of the Army and
even within them, for exaiple, a communication company of a
division loses with each man one out of the tean of fcir
required to employ a communication truck.. In a stationary
communication company on the other hand a redistribution and
reassignment of functions after -he Loss of individuals is
relatively easy and dees aot represent a major impac-^ on the
readiness of the unit.
But the distance to home need not have only
negative effects on the readiness of a company. If, fcr exam-
ple, a policy is main-'-ained which makes clear what the
expectations for performance and conduct are by which addi-
tional duties can be avoided and the trip home rvery weekend
can be assured, the willingness to cooperate is widespread
among conscripts.
(^) li£iZ Etl^l.§®« A ti-" aspect which reduced
the rediness of a unit dramatically came with increasing
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unsmployment. Because of tha reality that not all persons
eligible for the draft were needed ia tha Armed Forces and
the fact that several employers started training courses
only once a year, a policy was established by che Ministry
of Defense (HOD) . It red tio deny release to those draftees in
the last quarter of their service ziiie, thereby forcing them
to miss a civilian training course f^r at least nine lonths,
would mean an unacceptable hardship. Those draftees whc
could prove that they had a con-ract for such an
apprenticeship could be recommended for early release.
7- Civic Education and Lea dershi d
a. Public Education
The public education has significantly improved
in Germany over "rhe past decade with respect to educa-.ion
about the rights and du-ias of the individual in a democ-
ratic society and the necessity of CDn-^ribnticns from the
citizens to maintain this society. 3ut -Respite the fac- that
tha majority of the population has since 19U9 only experi-
enced a democratic form of s*ate, tha draft is s-.iil far
from being considered a vital contribu-ion to sccie^.y.
Therefore information and insrr uctions about -^ha functioning
of the society and its basic principles with a change in




C) Knowled ge. Tha priiniry aim of civic educa-
tion is to provide the soldiers with the motivation for
their occupation. For iihis knowledge of the basic facts of
their nation and its constitution ani laws is an elementary
requirement. In the sixties the orinciple topics were
information about the legal basis for -^he military, the
place of the Armed Forces in the democra-cic society, the
rights and duties of soldiers and thr correct treatment of
subordinates. In the seventies a shift took place from
these legal aspects towards more psychological aspects such
as the motivation of the soldiers for the required duties,
the personal relation between superiors and subordina-^es and
the importance of trust and group cohesion for readiness
[R3f. 45: p. 25].
(2) Information . \ further very important
aspect for civic education is the maaner, kind and detail in
which information are provided and by whome. Because this
problem of building confidence and trust into the leadership
and the military in general is of great imDcrtance in peace
time. During a war this process is essential for maintaining
effective units because the demand for information is
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immense and will be satisfied with ramors if there are no
established channels and confidence in the leadership during
normal operations. This process has to be analysed not only
with respect to the capabilities of the company commander
and the platoon leaders but in particular in terms of the
corporals who maintain the closest contact to rank and
file. In addition as *. hey belong to roughly the same age
group as the draftees they have a grsater appriciation of
their problems and needs than would be -rue of a xhirty-five
year old company commander. The difficulties of the NCOs
will be with respect to articulation and argumentation
because zheir education was different from that of high-
school graduated drafxees. In addition, they have -^.he prob-
lem of maintaining their authority aii a acceptable
relationship with the conscripts.
(3) 2x2eriencin2 Citizenis Riahts. The objec-
tive here is to go bejond the improvement of Icnowledge and
give the draftees an opportunity to =xperience the honoring
of their rights during the everyday duties. Even though
those rights are limited iuring their time with the ser-




Concerning th= comittmant to democratic princi-
ples by the draftees, a stady [ Hef . 46: p. 109] suggested
that it generally improved during tine of service, but ^hat
the number of those who ware convinced of the necessity of
the draft decreased at the same time. The primary reason men-
tioned for this decrease was the feeling among conscripts of
boredom, wasted rime, uncha llenging jobs, etc. To eliminate
the reasons for these deraotivating circumstances has to be a
major concern of each company commander.
Means of accomplishing this are careful planning
and organization of the weekly schedule and a permanent com-
munication process zhat makes it understandable that a pri-
mary task of the military is to be present and that it is
difficult with decreasing funds to organize a constantly
challenging service time.
8 • Social Factors
This final section contains the evaluation of all
those factors which have an impact on the life of the draf-
tee during his service time. They primarily impact on his





C) Personnel Arrangements. The primary -^argpt
must be living conditions and quarters because the draf-ees
are obliged to live in the barracks. An important asp'^c-^
here is the number of occupants which ncrnally varies bet-
ween six and twelve soldiers per roon. It should be a prin-
ciple to locate those soldiers riogether who are employed in
a team . This is even more important in order to make up
for the negative effects of the quarterwise personnel
replacement,. The establishing of group cohesion and effec-
tive teams can be betrer supported by havirg i-s members
live together. Although this may favor the building of a
social hierarchy, this system ensures -^.he quick integration
of the newly assigned draftees into their -^eam. The proce-
dure to keep those groups together which were built in -h<=
basic training unit until the end of their service -ime,
frequently results in vandalism directed against the furni-
ture and the room. This release of their anger againsx -^he
military usually occurs in their last quarter. This activ-
ity can be reduced by the presence of others who still have
quite a time to serve and are interested in maintaining a
tolerable conduct and a good condition of their quarters.
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(2) Material. As a result of ecconomical fac-
tors (i.e. the monthly pay for draftses is below one hundred
dollars) draftees are required to remain in quarters during
off-duty hours. It is therefore important that quarters be
adequately maintained to make off-duty time as pleasant as
possible. Measures have to be taken to improve the condi-
tion periodically and also to make tha quarters more comfor-
table, e.g., providing paint and material for pinboards or
purchasing table cloths and allowing certain arrangements of
the furniture.
b. Recreation Installations
This category comprises nostly those installa-
tions which are provided by the MOD because of the infras-
tructural requirements and the costs. Examples are clubs
for officers, NCOs and rank and fila, autocare facilities,
saunas, etc. But some of these facilities can also be
installed in already existing baildiags if the company
commander applies for the change of utilization.
c. Recreation Measures
C) 5£2]12 4^1=lilii§» ^- order to promote the
objective of group cohesion during the off-duty time,
several measures can be taken. Ths iiost common one is to
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support SDcial activities on platoon or company level or
within the NCO corps by providing the facilities and/or
transportation. Tours to public or other mili-^ary installa-
tions as well as those of t h® allies are possible. Such
activities are motivated by the desire to promote educa-
tional goals and improve interpersonal relations. A furthe:
area of freguent activities is the arrangement of spor-
activiuies and competitions.
(2) IH^izi^H^i Sii££ort. The means which are
provided to help soldiers organize t^eir off-duty time or
even provide them with possibilities for activities are
egually important and various. They can include the esxab-
lishment of a recreation office, run by a draftee, which
gathers information and organizes events and activi-
ties. Other measures are to provide books, newspapers and
entertainment electronics,
d- Funds
(1) Budaet. The first source of financial
resources are the funds annually pro7ided in the mili-ary
budget. These funds can only be spen*- f^r hardware which is
listed in a specific regulation. The major Things it can be
spent for are TV and radio sets, sport eguipmen- and tools.
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(2) Canteens . The second source is the money
spent in the canteens inside the barracks. The lease agree-
ment requires that a percentage of th? tnon-^.hly sales has to
be transfered to the companies. The expenditures have to be
authorized by a board consisting of "^he battalion commander,
the company commanders, the head of the local Armed Forces
Administration and the sreward of the MCOs and of rank and
file. This money can be spent in all those fields of
recreation for which no funds are provided. This can be to
buy presents for hospitiali zed soldiers, to honor outstand-
ing draftees at the end of their service time wi-h = bock
and to improve the dinner for those who are on duty over
Christmas. Another '^ay is to buy paint and material -o
improve the living quarters of the soldiers. The problem her'=»
is that there are official funds available bu* only in very
long time intervals.
The criteria for the evaluation of the personnel
readiness of a unit outlined in the previous two chapters
represent those factors which are coisidered to b*:^ the sin-
gle most important ones. Combinations of some of these fac-
tors result in readiness factors whirh should be evaluated
in the other major parts of the company inspection. Such
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combinations of personnGl readiness criteria influence, for
example, the performance in sports and shooting competitions
and in general that during the field exercise.
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III. HES0LT5 AND EICCOMENDATIONS
In order t.o achieve an adequate readiness evaluation the
first step should be to determine frcm the mission, histori-
cal data and the experience of present and former commanders
the variance of the factors, their wsight and the benchmarks
with respect to the four readiness categories of ths ITT6
for all unit types.
An optimal design of the personnel readiness function
can be determined, by developing and analysing different
configurations of those criteria. Tiis procedure will avoid
the situation that where a high function value is achieved
by concentration on a few lower
priority areas.
A. PHYSICAL READINESS
1 • P^irll Z§I§2SIi§l Str enath R=22ii.
a- Actual Streng-h
The emphasis with respect to the benchmarks for
actual strength is to show if -he re5uired streng-h for -his
unit type is maintained. This figure will change over -he
year and reach a low of fifty percent of the authorized
6H

strength during the holiday season aad the maximal value
during exercises. These categories can consist of different
intervals for officers, NCOs and rank and file depending on
(1) formal training course requiremaits, (2) th= mission of
the unit, (3) its equipment and (U) the ratio of these three
personnel categories to each other.
Further they have to he based on an evaluation
of the average time a "standard" NCO is available in the
unit expressed in man-weeks or man-days. That means, for
example, for corporals who may have an average anlistment
time of three years for this unit type, that 'hey, by
attending the reqired formal training courses for their MOS
and those for secondary functions and their annual hollidays
are only available for thsir unit ab^ut seventeen months,
about half of their enlistment time. A similar evaluation is
required for sergeants and officers.
The reporting form should also show those groups
or functions in a unit which are critical with respec- to
its deploy ability such as control and crypto personnel in a
communication company.
These data could be analysed during a company
inspection with respect to the readiness category the
bD

unit has belonged to during most of the training or during
exercises and provide the basis to evaluate the observed
performence. It could for example show the effect of plan-
ning and organization within a unit to achieve a high degree
of readiness with limited resources.
These readiness categories would simplify the
analysis of the reported strengths and make it easier to
give feedback to the unit in the form of better coordination
and planning of duties and projects and eventual support for
a unit which has reached d r is aboac to reach a cri-^ical
status by transfering personnel or centralizing training
within a battalion.
b. Availability for Training
The proposals in this section are made under the
assumption of guarterwise replacement of the draftees in the
platoons. Further, it is assumed Tihit the principle level
for instruction is that of the platoon with an average
strength of about twenty-five men and four NCOs. The inten-
tion is -co suggest organizational measures to ensure effi-
cient training. Although organization alone does net guaran-




The svaluation of a unit's perforiiance with
respect to high parti cipa*- ion in training requires that the
training material be categorized with respect to its impor-
tance for the respective MOS an'i the unit's mission. But the
importance of attendance in, for example, the highest cate-
gory for instruction may also depend on the training quarter
of the draftee. For example, instructions about the use of
traffic abbreviations is essential fDr a newly assined sol-
dier while it is only repetition for one in a higher
training quarter.
But for other parts of the training, even though
they represent repetition, complete attendance is
required. Those areas are exercises aid field training on the
various levels of command, safety and security instructions,
weapons training, sports and all cthrr parts of training
which primarily have a strong impact on group cohesion and
cooperation within the deployment structure of a unit.
Depending on the mission and equipmep.t of a unit,
maintenance may also be such an important categDry.
If these training categories are defined, the
attendance can be checked by the battalion commander or his




The function Df the company commander to achiev=^
high attendance should be to initiate and maintain organiza-
tional measures which are able to give the draftees and the
respective instructors ths feeling of the importance of
those parts of the training.
Because this area is alsD subject to outside
influence such as measures of the battalion staff, the medi-
cal facilities and other companies, a policy should be
adopted by the battalion which allows planning and coordina-
tion of projects. By this approach, conflicts of intrests
can be avoided and the number of soliiers who are withheld
from important training on short notice tasks are
drastically reduced.
2. ^iiarterl;^ E§E2£i 211 ^2S-fill?d Positions
These quarterly reports should provide the basis for
the evaluation of a unit's personnal structure =ind its
prospects for the near futur^'.
On the basis of tie information contain=d in these
reports and the requirements concerning formal training
courses and the time limits outlined in the training and
employment catalog for NCDs, the personnel selection,




The billets which are vital for the mission of a
unit and/or are only authorized as individuals or in small
numbers have to be thoroughly checked for complete training
and continous occupation. The nunibec of man-hours available
per quarter or year compared to the scheduled 1980 annual
service hours may be an appropriate basis for ttie analysis
It may also be adequate to check if other NCOs with related
MOSs are trained for thess functions in order to have them
available as backups during exercisss or in the case of an
emergency.
An important criterion for the personnel readiness
of a unit can also be the a nlistment time structure of the
NCDs. That means for the NCOs, how uany enlisted for two,
four, eight or twelve years. As ths minimum -tiie require-
ments to be promoted to corporal or sergeant ar? fifteen
months respectively four v^ars, ir is important to have at
least fifty percent of tha NCOs in each category with
enlistment times significantly longer. That is, a company
where the majority of the corporals has only a service time
of two years, does not havs an op-^-imal degree of readiness
because of their lack of experience, even though all billets
are filled. In order to iefine a realistic mix of
69

enlistment times it is necessary to know the skill level
which was considered necessary when the rank szracture and
the ratio of leaders to rank and file for the rOE of the
unit was established.
The availability of NCOs daring important events
such as exercises or inspections and essential training can
be analysed with respect to bottelnecks and provisions made
to reduce the effects of unavoidable events on readiness.
Included in this report should be all those func-
tions which are not covered in the TOE but are necessary -o
provide complete training and readin9ss of the unit. Within
a communication unit, there could be training for non stan-
dard telecommunication, telephone ana cypher equipment, NBC
defense, first aid, safety and security, marksmanship,
firefighting and salvage and rescue etc.
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
''
• ^isciglina r2 Heans
The analysis of handling the disciplinary power
should be primarily concerned with ganeral trends rather
than individual cases. The annual rBport of -h= ombudsman
of parliament can serve as a good reference and indicator
for actual problems and trends in ths Armed Forces
70

concerning morale and discipline. T!iis document is further
of great importance because it contains relevant
interpretations of the law and policy s-atements of
the MOD.
Other important incidents such as objections to
serve in the Armed Forces, suicides or complaints handed to
the ombudsman of parliament and to its petition commirtee on
the other hand have to be analysed with respect to -heir
effects on t;he morale and motivation of the unit.
The analysis of the application of disciplinary mea-
sures should first be with respect to formal correctness.
This can be done by checking the disciplinary book of the
unit which consists cf two parts. The first part con-ains
all valid disciplinary measures issued against soldiers of
the company and a form for each individual where da-e of
punishment, validity and prescription are documented . For
this part an actual pagecoiint of all valid measures in the
book has to be kept. The second part of the book contains
the formal recognitions for each individual which in con-
trast to the punitive measures do no-, become invalid af-^er a
certain amount of time. All the dates and *he status of the
papers have to be properly signed by the company commander
or the au-horized deputy.
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a. Formal Rs cog nit ions
Criteria fci: the analysis of the forrinal recogni-
tions can be the distribution between enlisted and rank and
file. The leader's example plays an important role with
respect to performance and readiness. This is normally docu-
mented in the high number of recognitions for them.
But there should be at Isast an evei number of
formal recognitions for draftees. Ths principal reason is
their in general outstanding morale and readiness during
field exercises despite the fact that they are drafted. A
further reason is that they often have to fill in for absen^^.
NCOs and perform well despite the lack of ^.raining and
experience.
Anorher aspect for analysis should be the events
and performances for which formal rarognitons ar* awarded.
They can show the sensitivity and emphasis of a company com-
mander with respect to performance and motivation.
This analysis can also unveil different percep-
tions of leadership and motivation by comparing the




The analysis should primarily be concerned with
general trends subject to disciplinary measures rather than
individual cases.
The most important part is the analysis of the
disciplinary measures since the last company inspection with
respect to their kind, personnel involved and frequency .This
provides good indicators of morale problems in a unit and
particular problems in the military aducaxion and training
or between individual leaders and -chsir subordinates. But
it may also be necessary to look in-D special cases if there
are violations of constitutional rights or ccmmitred
felonies.
The analysis cannot be extended irnio the chosen
punishment which is the sole responsibility of the company
commander and would mean an interferance into his sovereig-
nity. Nevertheless, the applied scale and the treatments
provide information about t h«=' skills of a company commander
and his subordinate leaders to deal with disciplinary prob-




2 . Co m£laint3
To enable an analysis of th.B complaints procc'^sse'l
during the last inspection, a data gathering process of
these historical data has to be authorized. Data gathered
should contain information about the numbers, category (dis-
ciplinary, general service, adiinistrative) of the
complaint, it.s object and whether it was accepted or
rejected.
General problems of importance for the analysis may
be alcohol abuse, disobedience, abusa of the right to give
orders, general tensions etc.
This part of the analysis should also i.iclude the
number and reasons for disciplinary measures which had been
invalidated during the check by the aext two disciplinary
leaders or the military disciplinary lawyer because of for-
mal errors or insufficiencies in the formulation of the
sentencing,
3 • 3va luat ions
The first criteria in the analysis of the evalua-
tions should also be their formal correctness. Errors are
frequent with respect to personal ani service data and
missmatches between the marked personal and performance
7'4

characteristics of an individual and their free
description.
The far more important critaria are again the proce-
dure and interaction during the process in which ths assess-
ments are made and perceptions of performance are passed on
frDra the company commander to the respective subordinate.
The emphasis here should ba on th? ways by which the ass-
essed are kept informed about their relative position, the
expectations of their company commander and their chances to
achieve set goals. An important procedure is a periodic
evaluation briefing for the individuals to keep them
informed of the perception of their performance and to moti-
vate them to improve it. By this, unpleasant surprises at
the day of signing the evaluation ca-i be avoided.
Circumstances which also need to be considered in
analysing the evaluations in a company are the length of
time the company commander has known the man he has to eval-
uate. Further it is important that his own experience and
qualifications which may bias his expectations with respect
to an average performance or may resale in -^oo benevolent
evaluations if he fears th= confrontation with the evaluated
be considered. The battalion commander should further
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assess the objectivity of the evaluation criteria and look
for evaluation errors such as -he halo effect, selective
recognition and generalizations.
Other criteria ar? the regular conditions under
which the evaluatees work and factors which may degrade
their performance (e. g. personnel and material shortages or
the lack of adeguate training) and wtiich are not perceived
as constraints by the evaluating company commander.
The final aspect in analysing the evaluation proce-
dure is the distribution of the final grades. For every
branch of the Army and even each unit type thera exist
characteristic distributions which can be used as
orientation.
During the company inspection the battalion comman-
der should therefore evaluate significant deviations from
the average and discrepan::ies from hi3 own assessment, of
individual NCOs.
** • ^Ulisllils^ §.Ii^ Reen listment
In ihis category the analysis should unveil the
degree to which the demand for enlistments and reenlistments
in the company could be satisfied. This has to be based en
the overall situation of the respective branch of the Army
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and the local conditions for that unit. Further the selec-
tion and planning process of the careers for the NCOs and
rank and file of the company has to be evaluated as the most
important part of this analysis.
Anoxher part of th2 analysis has to be the amount of
enlisted and trained officer cadets for the reserve. These
enlistments for two years provide tha companies with person-
nel who do not occupy MOS positions and by this can
compensate for those NCOs who are attending a training
course.
There should also be an evaluation of those case?
where a change of the military training and employment cate-
gory was necessary in order to reenlist an NCO who belonged
to one of those MOSs for which only very few sergeant
billets are available.
Other points for the analysis can be the number of
unfilled billets with own r eenlistments or how many NCOs are
applying for reenlist ment but for which no billets =ire
available.
A final point: should be the number and chances of
applicants for career billets. Here the battalion commander
has also a significant influence beciuse he can increase




The turnover category of a \iiit could be assessed as
a weighting factor for th? strength rating of a company.
The evaluation intervals for officers and NCOs could be
smaller than those of the rank and file to emphasize the
important role of the leadership in a unit for its morale,
training status and readiness.
For draftees the amphasis should be on the replace-
ment rhythm, the percentages of those who are transf err'=-d to
uni-t-s closer to their families and of those who are released
earlier. There number and cases should be analysed with
respect to those draftees who remainad in the unit. The
effect may be predominanrly negative.
The multiplicative factor to weight the personnel
strength should also be considered with respect to the unit
type. It could for example be smaller for a stationary
communication company than for a mobile one.
The replacement cycle of draftees has to be consid-
ered very carefully to soften its negative effects. Alter-
natives to the quarterwise replacemen-^ can be replacements
every half year or per entire platooa. But the effecrs of
differently qualified personnel has * o be considered
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carefully because, for example, nearly all highschool gradu-
ates are drafted in the summer quarter and when not
available to a unit could mean a considerable loss.
6 • Ci vie Education aa d Leadership
The main sources Df information about motiva-^ion and
the climate in a unit daring the company inspection can be
the instructions in civic education and leadership and an
interview with the elected stewards for the NCOs and for
rank and file.
The instruction can show the approach and msans by
which the officers and NCDs work towards the primary educa-
tional obiective for the Armed Forces. This is the benefit
of society instead of the individual and the process of mak-
ing understandable that their service is an essential con-
tribution to this need. It will farther provide insight
into the ability of the leadership of the company to explain
problems concerning the Amed Forces and to mc-ivate the
draftees to make up their minds in discussions with others.
Besides the capability to explain basic positions the main
effort during the presentation shouli be directed towards
the way each others* arguments are handled and how a
consensus is reached. To iindersrand and resoect diff^^rent
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oppinions is the basis for trust and comradeship and
essential for motivation and succesfal job performance.
The important cri'reria of information processing and
exchange should not only be analysed with respect to the
perfomance during the instruction, it should also include
the observation during the field exercise where permanent
briefings are required to enable all m^n to participate and
contribute activly to performance of their unit.
The interviev with the stewards is of importance
because they enjoy important privileges and duties within
the German Armed Forces which are determined by a special
law. They have for example to be heard by the company comman-
der about the personality of the individual accused of an
offense and their statements have to be documented. They
may further be involved in the process of setting up the
schedules for presence duties. This scheduling represents a
problem because it has a strong influence on the leisure
time of the individuals. If the for^ians' pcsicion and
influence can be utilised by the company commander, they can





The most important objective in this part of the
analysis have to be the measures taken and the initia-ives
instituted to maintain th3 living qairters in good condi-
tion. The draftees should be able to feel at home for the
twelve months of their service time.
The number of occupants, room conditions, amount of
private equipment allowed etc, shouii be evaluated.
Another area of analysis has to be the kind and con-
dition of facilities provided by the company such as hobby
and crafts rooms, messes, tv rooms ar.d sport installations,
A further criteria should be the response to the recrea-
tional installations, which indicates whether or no-^- the
facilities meet the needs of the draftses,
Obiectives with raspect to the recreational activi-
ties should be the degree by which the leadership of a com-
pany initiates or promotes activi-^,ias which contribute to
the group cohesion and identification with the unit. It
should be distinguished between the activities within the
NC3 corps and those for the draftees. Because of the impor-
tance of the NCOS to the readiness of a unit, efforts toward
cohesion require much more emphasis than that of rank and
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file for whom entertainment may be an ?q\ially important
aspect.
As the funds are authorized by a comittee, the ana-
lysis can focus on the procedure by irhich the objec-ives for
activities were determined, that maans zo what degree the





The mDtivation for this effort was to provide sugges-
tions for the selection of personnel readiness criteria for
West German Army units. These criteria are intanded to be
primarily evaluated during the annual company inspection.
They represent an important part in the evaluation of the
overall readiness of a unit.
By suggesting these criteria it was intended to simplify
and guide the efforts wizhin the units regarding personnel
readiness. If the criteria are elaborated as suggested in
the previous chapter, uncertainties and misconceptions about
optimal performance can be reduced resulting in a more
efficient utilization of resources.
Another effect of establishing these criteria can be -^-o
provide the Army with procedures and data which enable it
notonly to make relevan*: evaluations for various branches of
the Army as well as provide input to the development cf
TOEs, training programs, etc.
A further intention of this effort has been to provide
information or guidelines for company and battalion




Combinations of soma of '•he personnel readiness criteri=»
result in factors which should be evaluated in the other
major parts of the company inspection. These criteria
influence, for example, performance in sports and shooting
competitions and in general that during the field exercise.
Certain possible factors or criteria were not covered in
this effort. The primary reason beiig the lack of relevant
data during a company inspection for a meaningfull
evaluation.
One such facror is combat motivacion. I-^ contains all
those factors which influence the motivation of a soldier to
fight during a battle. Combat motivation is coasidered zo
represent the complement to defense lotivaticn which
describes the basic motivational nee^s for a soldier's ser-
vice and can be observed in the part about civi^ education
and leadership.
The criterion of leadership performance is consider^^d to
be best assessed during the field exarcise and the evalua-
tion of training and maintenance and should therefore be
evaluated in that ccn-ext.
Overall this effort should provide sufficient cri-<=ria
on which to base the evaluation of a company inspection. It
8U

should be more realistic than the ITIS and may result in the
downgrading of units because of thsir personnel
deficiencies.
In -his procedure the inspecting commander still re*-.ains
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